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The term Eurasia is a contentious and illusive one and there is no consensus or agreement
among authors on its meanings, implications and ramiﬁcations. President Nursultan
Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan introduced and developed his own vision,
policies, perceptions and values of Eurasianism which he has been propagating and
practicing on a continuous and consistent basis. In fact, the concept of Eurasianism and
Eurasian policies have turned into state ideologies which are reﬂected in domestic,
regional and foreign policies as well as in the foundation of the recent regional integration
process. The purpose of the article is: to study and review the genesis of the old, popular as
well as contemporary schools and thoughts of Eurasianism, their underlying goals, ob-
jectives and purposes in order to locate and understand Kazakhstan’s views and concepts
of Eurasianism in a broad historical and comparative perspectives; to review and critically
analyze how President Nazarbayev’s visions and policies of Eurasianism are reﬂected in the
country’s domestic, regional and foreign policies and what are their implications.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The term ‘Eurasia’ is rooted in the classical theories and
concepts of ‘Geo-politics’ particularly the concepts of
‘pivot’ and later ‘heartland’ deﬁned and developed by
British Geographer Sir Hartford Mackinder in 1904, where
he identiﬁed the huge landmass of the east of Urals as the
‘pivot’ and claimed that whoever will control this vastmobile); fax: þ7 727
@yahoo.com.
arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haterritory control global politics (Mackinder, 1904, 421–
444). Eurasia is a highly debated, contested and illusive
term with different meanings and perceptions in time and
space. It has two apparent meanings and dimensions:
geographical and politico-philosophical-ideological; where
the ﬁrst one deals with space and location meaning Eurasia
is a place (space) which is located both in Asia and Europe;
the other is more complex and complicated with multiple
views and perceptions, often conﬂicting and contradictory,
probably with one common feature that the concept of
Eurasia ﬁrst emerged and evolved in imperial Russia (Isaev
1991; Ivanov, Polikov, Tugashev, & Shishin, 2007; Schmidt
2005; Sengupta, 2009).
The term ‘Eurasianism’ is more of a politico-ideological
and philosophical concept and understanding with multi-
dimensional features and aspects that emerged and re-
emerged in various historical stages by philosophers, his-
torians, nationalists, communists as well as individual
groups and leaders for pursuing their respective goals andnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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geopolitical concept of Eurasianism, with all its changes
and modiﬁcations, is still very powerful, dominant and
alive in historic-cultural, academic, as well as national po-
litical and ideological debates and discourse.1 Turkish Eur-
asianism is mainly an idea and vision of creating a
commonwealth of Turkic states inhabited by Turkish peo-
ples including parts of Russia and Central Asia. Kazakh-
stan’s vision of Eurasianism and creation of the Eurasian
Union based on Eurasian solidarity is an ofﬁcial policy
(ideology) developed, launched and being implemented by
Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan that fundamentally differs from those of
Russian, Turkish and others forms in terms of underlying
goals, objectives, methods, directions and mechanisms of
implementation.
The purpose of the article is to brieﬂy deﬁne the con-
cepts of Eurasia and Eurasianism, its various forms, debates,
interpretations and directions, overtime changes, evolu-
tions and current policy debates and discussions. The main
concentration is on Kazakhstan’s vision of Eurasianism, its
evolution and differentiation, nature, characteristics, im-
plications and reﬂections on the country’s domestic,
regional and global politics in building a peaceful har-
monies nation as well as balancing and maintaining a
multivector foreign policy. The article raises and critically
analyzes the challenges and difﬁculties of Kazakhstan’s
Eurasian policies, particularly in relations with neighboring
and regional countries. The conclusion will succinctly
summarize the potential beneﬁts and advantages of Presi-
dent Nazarbayev’s Eurasian policy.
2. Literature review
The literature in the ﬁeld is huge and multidimensional
and it is not easy to divide or classify them into various
categories. However, for the purpose of review and anal-
ysis, the author has divided them into the following broad
categories:
First, the classical andneo-classicalwriters ofGeo-politics
and the concepts of Eurasia and Eurasianism who were
mainly EuropeanandRussianorigins and their primary focus
was ongeo-political, strategic and security interests of Russia
as a ‘pivotal’ state of Eurasia. Author like, HartfordMackinder,
Pytor Chaadev, Vasily Tatishchev, Nikolai Danilevsky, Alex-
ander Pompiansky, Nikolai Trubetskoi, Peter Savitskiy,
Nikolai Alekseev, Issaev, Longworth, Leonid Gimilev, Mark
Bassin and Alexander Dugin can be classiﬁed into this cate-
gory. They emphasized the importance of the Eurasian
landmass as the pivotal of the world and since Russia is
located in the center, it has the natural right and power to
control and play dominant role in Eurasia. One of their main
claims was that Russia is neither a European nor an Asian
country rather a Eurasian one and it must protect, preserve
and promote its identity accordingly.1 Among the classical Russian Eursianists, Pytor Chaadev, Vasily
Tatishchev, Nikolai Danilevsky, Alexander Pompiansky are the most
important ones. For details, see Mathew Schmidt, “Is Putin Pursuing a
Policy of Eurasianism?” www.ﬁndarticles.com/p/articles//mi_qa3996/is_
200501/ai_n13640828.Second, in this category of literature, we can include the
wide varieties of authors who wrote about other types and
forms of Eurasia and Eurasianism often challenging and
contradicting the Russian centric views and perceptions
claiming that Russia is at the center of Eurasia and that very
geographical fact gives it special role and privilege to claim
the leadership position but it is not the only Eurasian state.
These are mainly authors from Central Asian and Caucasian
origins. Authors like, Osmanov, Simavoryan, Matikeeva,
Sengupta, Tolipov, Shrielman, Ivanov and others can be
classiﬁed into this category who claim, at various levels,
that the Center of Eurasia can be in China, greater Central
Asia or in the Caucasus. They do not have any single or
cohesive theory or concept of Eurasianism rather challenge
the notion that Russia is the center of Eurasia and argue
that the concept is disputed and divisive.
Third, in the third group of literature we can include the
authors and writers of Kazakhstani Eurasianism where
President Nursultan Nazarbayev seems to be the main
advocate and proponent of creating a Eurasian Union based
on the common economic, political and security interests
of the Eurasian states. In his numerous books, monographs,
articles and memoirs, he elaborated his detailed policy
perceptions, arguments and roadmaps for creating and
implementing the policies of Eurasianism. Other authors,
mainly Kazakhstani ones, like Sultanov, Laumulin, Shake-
nova, Tokaev, Nyssanbaev, Tulepbergenova, Baipakova,
Gulyamova, Sidorovich and Qoraboyev generally support
the above view.
In the fourth group of literature we can include the
recent ofﬁcial documents, speeches and articles published
by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus
regarding the various issues and aspects of the creation of
the Customs Union and its gradual progression to a
Eurasian Union which are mainly considered as more of
policy papers and documents rather than serious academic
and research materials.
In the ﬁnal group of literature, we can include the au-
thors (mainly foreign) who criticize the concepts of Eurasia
and Eurasianism from various points of views and per-
spectives and cast doubts and suspicions about the success
of the proposed Eurasian Union. Authors like, Laruelle,
Gleason, Shlapentokh, Cutler, Weitz, Bohr, Masanov,
Schmidt and others can be included into this category.
3. Russian Eurasianism
The Russian concept of Eurasianism started as a philo-
sophical and political movement at the beginning of the XX
century developed by Russian intellectuals who emigrated
after the Communist revolution in 1917 (Trubetskoi,
Savitskiy, Alekseev & Longworth, 2005). The Russian pan-
Eurasian nationalists were worried about the disintegra-
tionof theEurasian commonculture, language (Russian) and
values and wanted to stop the potential threats of emerging
regional identities (pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, pan-Asian-
ism and so on) in order to keep and promote an all-Eurasian
identity that could unite all peoples in Russia and its pe-
riphery in a single entity. Eurasianismwas born as a reaction
to the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks’ coming to
power. Interestingly, classical Russian Eurasianists were
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because; for them bothwere European products. Russiawas
not considered as a national state rather a unique form of
civilization that contained diverse cultures juxtaposed by
the nomadic Turkic heritage and that of the Orthodox
traditionalists who believed that the Russian culture can
only be protected by opposing to the Western culture
through the policy of Eurasianism. It was strongly believed
and asserted that Russia is more closely associated with its
eastern neighbors and was a part of Mongol Empire before
the “Europeanization” (Masanov & Chebotarev, 2000). The
notion of Eurasianism emerged as a savior of geographical,
ethnical and cultural integration and identity as Russia was
afraid of being divided into two parts – Asia and Europe-
dinstead it wanted to be seen as a state that combined both
Asian and European culture and heritage (Keizer, 1998).
Kolchigin (quoted inNyssanbayev&Dunaev, 2010)pinpoints
ﬁve aspects of “Eurasianism’: a) it is an idea of cultural dialog
between Europe and Asia, b) it is the deﬁnition of the super
ethnic collectivity; c) it is a both ideological and political
movement of the 1920s of the 20th century; d) it is an idea of
regional integration in the Eurasian territory; e) it is put
forward in opposing to the encroachment of western civili-
zation for the sake of the establishment of theRussianWorld
Empire.
Despite the heavy handed practice of Marxist–Leninist
ideology, Soviet communismwas apparently not in conﬂict
or contradiction with the concept of Eurasianism rather it
was used to conquer and consolidate Russian power and its
inﬂuence and hegemony in the bordering areas. Russian
Eurasianists enthusiastically endorsed and supported the
creation of the Soviet Union that forcefully integrated the
Central Asian and Caucasian regions and turned into a So-
viet Eurasian Empire. According to Leonid Gumilev (1970),
one of the most inﬂuential proponents of Eurasian concept,
Russian Eurasianism is based on the argument that
geographically Russia is located both in Europe and Asia and
it has both Asian and European elements in terms of people,
religion and geography. It was believed that geographically,
culturally, linguistically, religiously, psychologically as well
as from national, ideological and philosophical contexts
Russia is closer to Asia and shares many of the Asian cul-
tures andmentalities than those of Europe. He also believed
that Russia is the center of the ‘old world’ not only in cul-
tural and historical sense but also in politico-economic and
geographic terms and it occupies a special place in Eurasian
geo-political space whose main mission, as a central power,
is to balance interests between Asia and Europe. Some ultra-
nationalists believe and argue that Eurasianism shares
common spiritual unity among Islamic, Buddhist and Or-
thodox nations based on collective unity and ideal govern-
ment (Schmidt, 2005). During the Perestroika and the dying
days of the USSR, some Russian politicians and intellectuals
urged for recalling the concept of Eurasianism as a rallying
point for saving the Union (Isaev, 1991).
With the demise of the USSR, the Russian Eurasian
concept and ideology did not disappear rather invigorate
and got new impetus and support from Russian nationalists
who advocated for hard-line, aggressive policies toward
Central Asia and southern Caucasus. Alexander Dugin, a
popular nationalist Russian philosopher with anti-westernand anti-global views and perceptions, leads the Neo-
Eurasian movement in Russia and he is closely associated
with the political and military establishments in contem-
porary Russia who also strongly believes and propagates
that ‘a confrontation between the West and Eurasia is
inevitable’ (Shlapentokh, 2001). Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism
is primarily imperialistic and anti-democratic whose goal
is to create an empire in the post-Soviet space led by Russia
and for that matter a Moscow–Astana–Kiev geopolitical
triangle is important and imperative for guaranteeing the
stability of the Eurasian zone headed by Russia (Dugin,
1999; Laurelle, 2004; Schmidt, 2005). Nartov (2007) di-
vides the Neo-Eurasianist trends in Russia into three cate-
gories; ﬁrst the extreme rightist expansionists; second
those who emphasize on culture, language, folklore, Slavic-
Turkic alliance, and third, the defenders of the concept of
‘empire’ to be built on the continental space with the focus
on economic integration by a special type of statehood
based on diversity and freedom of language, culture and
ethnicity. While, Andrei Tsygankov (2003) believes that
there are ﬁve groups in Russian Eurasianists – expansion-
ists, civilizationists, stabilizers, geo-economists and west-
erners – and all have different views, perceptions and
orientations. Westerners believe that Russia shares more
common historical, religious and cultural elements with
Europe than those with Asia and argue that the future of
Russia lies with the West/Europe. They are convinced that
Russian modernists, business elites and bureaucrats will
never be ready to sacriﬁce their cozy, lavish, luxurious
Western way of living for the sake of communist/nation-
alist/expansionist causes of Eurasianism (Shlapentokh,
2001; Utkin, 2003). Trenin (2002) notes that Russia may
play a stronger role and have a place in the West as the
West is in economic trouble and Europe is getting weaker
institutionally, economically and becoming more depen-
dent on Russian energy resources.
Russian Neo-Eurasianists also challenge the concept of
Altantism claiming that it is not based on the idea of uni-
versalism rather on Westernization that combines two
cultures and civilizations – American and European –which
are fundamentally the same. On the same ground, they
reject the models of dividing the world into North-South,
East-West or Center-periphery. Proponents of this school
disagree with the Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the ‘End of
History’, challenge the notion of globalization and insist that
Eurasianism in the XXI century is a better alternative to both
Altantism and globalism. For them, Neo-Eurasianism, unlike
globalism, provides a living space for everyone and defends
and promotes language, culture, religion and civilizations of
all geographical areas including Africa and Asia-Paciﬁc.
Eurasian world view neither contradicts any national ideas
whether it is Russian, Mongolian, Ukrainian or Kazakh nor it
is against any ethnicity, nationality, religion or political in-
stitutions and organizations rather stands against any
nationalistic, ethno-centrist, religious fanatic of imperial
motives. Some Neo-Eurasianists propose to create a union
based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
consisting of major Asian countries like Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with a
future potential of India, Mongolia and Iran joining in it and
thus having a strong powerful strategic Eurasian Union
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et al., 2007, 327–345). Some advocate that the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) should be replaced by
the Eurasian Union and others go even further and insist
that Moscow should improve relations with the continental
Muslim countries, like Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in
order to expand the boundary of Eurasia all the way to the
Indian Ocean.
Russian Neo-Eurasianists enthusiastically supported
Vladimir Putin’s accession to power in Russia in early 2000
and his strong policy toward Georgia and other South
Caucasian states and viewed it as the ‘policy of Eurasianism
in action’. Putin’s statement of ‘Russia always felt itself a
Eurasian country’ at the APEC Summit in 2001 was
considered by the Neo-Eurasianists as an ofﬁcial declara-
tion of Russia’s Eurasian policy at a global forum (Putin,
2011). They are delighted with Putin’s return to power in
2012 and believe that the Eurasian project is close to his
heart and it will be the centerpiece of his foreign policy
(Buckley, 2011a). Putin’s vision of Eurasian Union is a grand
project that envisions a unity of all former Soviet states to
compete with the EU and China. In his words, “We are
proposing a model of a powerful, supranational association
capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world
..to play an effective bridge role between Europe and the
dynamic Asia-Paciﬁc Region,” (Putin, 2011). He called to all
former Soviet republics to join the ‘Eurasian Union’ and the
recently created Customs Union (CU) between Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus which is considered to be the ﬁrst
step toward the creation of a full ‘Eurasian Union’ by 2015
(Buckley, 2011b; Nazarbayev, 2003a; 2011). Although
Kazakhstan and Belarus welcomed and endorsed Putin’s
call and joined the union but with caution and their own
plans, other Post-Soviet states particularly Ukraine, Geor-
gia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are looking toward Europe and
are less interested in joining the CU because of their past
history and experiences of relations with Moscow.
4. Turkish Eurasianism
In the Turkish intellectual and academic debates, Eurasia
is considered of those areas and regions where mainly the
Turkic peoples are settled including the areas of modern day
Turkey, the Balkans, part of the former USSR, Central Asia,
the regions of Volga and Afghanistan (Sengupta, 2009, 21).
Turkish Eurasianism is mainly a plan of creating common-
wealth of Turkic states and the idea was more active and
popular during the early 1990s after the collapse of the USSR
when the ﬁve independent Central Asian states were
created who have close links with Turkey (except
Tajikistan); historically, culturally and ethno-linguistically
(Hamm, 2006). The Turkic-Muslim understanding of Eura-
sianism is propagated and supported by the Turkic-Muslim
populations in Russia who believe that they truly embody
Eurasia and Russia can only become a Eurasian power by
recognizing its Muslim populations. But it is mainly limited
in academic and intellectual debate and discussion rather
than a policy option or action plan. Observers believe that as
Kazakhstan, the most stable and resourceful country in
Central Asia is actively pursuing the policy of Eurasianism
and taking concrete steps and measures in expanding andpromoting it, there will be hardly any scope and support for
a separate Eurasianism based on the solidarity of Turkic-
Muslim ideology. Turkey may gain more by joining and
supporting Kazakhstan’s efforts and policies. Moreover, the
Turkish version of “Eurasianism” is not homogenous; it
embraces several approaches depending on the positions of
different parties. One popular view is that the creation of a
Eurasian Unionwill provide more opportunities for regional
economic cooperation (e.g. Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway
should become interlink connecting the central and east
Asia). Some belief that a well organized Eurasian Union can
be a balance to the European Union where Turkey has been
trying to become a member for the last 20 years. There is a
third trend that focuses on creating a Union of Turkic
Speaking nations and not a common Eurasian Union.
5. Other forms of Eurasianism
The concept of ‘Muslim Eurasia’ is mainly developed by
South Caucasian and Turkish authors that comprises
Muslim majority countries and territories in Central Asia
and Southern Caucasus which are not based on religiosity
or political ideology rather on secular, social-normative and
cultural values and traditions and the new identity can
function as a catalyst for peace, stability and harmony and
easily replace the old Soviet norms, values and culture. But
it is very unlikely that any union, integration or cooperation
based on a common religion will be acceptable by Central
Asian states as they are secular, multi-ethnic and multi-
religious. Matikeeva (2005) and Tolipov (2003) argue that
Central Asia should not be subordinated and covered by the
‘Heartland’ claimed by Russia, rather it can be the ‘Heart-
land’ by itself along with China and they propose their own
version of regional Central Asian Eurasianism. A group of
geo-political Eurasianists, mainly based in Azerbaijan and
Southern Caucasian region, emphasize the role and
importance of the Caspian Sea and claim that the Caspian
zone is the center of Eurasia where there is the junction of
three great civilizations; Turkic, Slavic and Aryan-Iranian
and two world religions; Islam and Christianity
(Shrielman, 2009, 72). They demand that they are the ones
who hold back the tides of ‘Atlantic civilization’ and thus
saved and protected the area from European–Christian
expansion (Usmanov, 1997, 378–379).
There is also an attempt to create a Eurasian Ecological-
Economic Union in the so called ‘great Altai’ region that
claimed to be located in the center of the Eurasian continent
and in the trajectory of four great civilizations; Russian,
Chinese, Mongolian and Kazakh. The argument is that all
world religions and Eurasian ethnic groups and sects live
peacefully in the Altai and at the same time the area is full of
natural resources and pure water. In 2002 an International
Consultative Council (MKC) was created that organizes and
conducts seminars and conferences on a regular basis and
seeks support from regional governments for their cause
(Ivanov et al., 2007, 226–230). As the idea involves terri-
tories of several sovereign states there is hardly any possi-
bility that a separate union will be successful.
Then there is the debate of ‘Economic Eurasianism’ by
those who believe that close economic and trade relations
among post-Soviet countries on the basis of economic
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common interests and historically their economies are
dependent and closely linked and connected with each
other and as a result they face serious challenges of
modernization and competitiveness in international mar-
kets. But the question is; whether a successful integration
in trade and economy can be created without political
supports and goodwill.
Analyzing the various forms and types of Eurasianism
Mark Bassin (2002) noted that all have two common ele-
ments; some synthesis of European and Asian principles
and modern Eurasianism claims to be legitimate heir of the
classical legacy. In Russia, it is about balancing against the
West and sharing of a common economic, geographic and
cultural space with other former Soviet states. Being
Eurasian means something different, special and superior
than those of either Asians (associated with such negative
stereotypes as underdevelopment, illiteracy, radicalism,
fundamentalism, terrorism, violence and so on) or Euro-
peans who share the history of ‘dark ages’, colonialism,
exploitation, two word wars and human degradation. But
modernists and others believe that the emergence of Neo-
Eurasianism in Russia is a mere reﬂection of frustration of
not being able to be developed and modernized enough to
be accepted as equal partner in Europewhile not ﬁnding an
appropriate role and place is emerging Asia.
5.1. Kazakhstan’s policy of Eurasianism
For Kazakhstan, Eurasia is a unique region where all
ethnic, cultural and religions groups live and co-exist
peacefully through centuries of mutual trust, belief and
understanding. The concept of space and geography is an
important factor in planning and determining a nation’s
foreign policy goals, objectives and directions and it is more
so for Kazakhstan; a vast, resourceful but landlocked
country. Geographically, Kazakhstan is an Asian country
and only about 10% of its territory is located in Europe but
geo-politically, geo-economically and geo-historically it
considers itself as a Eurasian state. During the early 1990s
the leadership of Kazakhstan proposed the concept of
Eurasia which was based on the principle that Kazakhstan
is located both in Asia and Europe and plays the role of a
‘bridge between Asia and Europe’. Kazakhstan’s Eurasian-
ism is promulgated as an ofﬁcial ideology by the top lead-
ership of the country and the focus was to build peace,
solidarity and unity among peoples on the basis of morality,
spirituality, cultural and historical interactions of peoples of
different ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious back-
grounds. As Nyssanbayev and Dunaev (2010) argue that all
these historical events and circumstances helped to create
an objective, congenial atmosphere and foundation for the
creation of a strong integration process. President Nursul-
tan Nazarbayev ﬁrst proposed his vision of Eurasianism in
his speech at the Moscow State University in Spring 1994
which he developed systematically and proposed as a se-
ries of projects including the creation of a Eurasian Union.
He further elaborated his vision of Eurasianism in 1995 in
one of his books when said if one looks at a geography then
it is easy to notice that there is a consecutive vertical row of
countries of Eurasia from Russia in the north to India in theSouth that does not yet link either with the east or with the
west. This continuous belt of countries situated along the
meridian of the center of Eurasia the ‘belt of anticipation’.
Despite all the differences among these countries they
constitute a relatively solid group from the point of view of
potential resources and possibilities of inﬂuencing not only
the balance of power in Asia or Eurasia but even the
geopolitical balance of the world (quoted in Sengupta,
2009, 24). His strong drive and motivation for creating
the Eurasian Union can also be explained by such
geographical factor as Kazakhstan’s landmass strides be-
tween Asia and Europe and contending claims and counter-
claims on the country’s real identity and belongingness. In
Nazarbayev’s own words;
There are individuals who likes to make a link between
Kazakhstan and Europe; and there are those who also
like to see Kazakhstan to be in close tie with the Asian
‘Tigers;’ still there others whowant to consider Russia as
our strategic partner, while suggesting not to ignore the
Turkish model for development. Paradoxically, they are
right in their own way, since they have felt the issue
from different angles. In reality, Kazakhstan, as a
Eurasian state that has its own history and its own
future, would have a completely different path to travel
down the road. Our model for development will not
resemble other countries; it will include in itself the
achievements from different civilizations (Eurasianism
in the 21st century, anonym, 2009).
The above statement explains the President’s visions
and policies on Eurasianismwhich he further elaborated in
later speeches and articles. For him, Kazakhstan is located
in the “epicenter of the world” and its new capital, Astana,
situated in the “heart of Eurasia” and this view is widely
shared by Kazakh scholars, academics and intellectuals and
it has been incorporated into the culture and educational
programs (Shrielman 2009, 71). In one of his books Presi-
dent Nazarbayev (2003a, 117–144) outlined the importance
of building a united Kazakhstani culture on the basis of
multi-ethnicity by building bridges among cultures of
different national, ethnic and religious groups. Kamal Bur-
hanov, a political scientist, supports the view and writes
that Kazakhstan is a community of different nationalities,
not a new ethnic community and an example of how inter-
ethnic and inter-religious harmony can be achieved
(Kazakhstanskaya, 2011). Oljas Suleimenov a well-known
Kazakh poet and writer, believes that independent
Kazakhstan illustrates the principles of a multiethnic,
tolerant, and diverse country typically characteristic to
Eurasia. He argues that the titular Kazakhs can no longer
deﬁne their identity without taking into account of the
European borrowings that has given them an access to
world advanced culture at large (Ram, 2001).
President Nazarbayev described the principles of his
vision of Eurasianism in an article in the Russian News-
paper Izvestiya published on October 25, 2011. According to
him, the Eurasian Union should be based on and follow four
basic principles; (1) it must be built on economic prag-
matism, (2) it must be based on voluntary participation of
member countries who must decide independently
whether they want to be locked in within their own
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created on the principles of equality, mutual respect for
sovereignty and not interference into domestic affairs of
others; (4) each member country should create its own
national institutions on the principles of consensus of all
participants without giving up national sovereignty
(Nazarbayev, 2011, 5–6). The President also reiterated that
the creation of the Eurasian Union will be, in no way,
restoration or recreation of the former USSR.
In the same article he elaborated the main characteris-
tics of the Union: (1) the Eurasian Union must be a
competitor in global economic space, (2) it must be
developed as a part of the Europe Atlantic and Asian areas
of development and economically it should be a bridge
between the dynamic developments in the EU, East, South-
East and South Asia, (3) the Eurasian Union should be
formed as a self-sufﬁcient ﬁnancial body which will be a
part of the new global ﬁnancial system, (4) geo-economi-
cally and geo-politically the Eurasian integration should
follow a special, evolutionary and voluntary path in future,
(5) such a Union can only be achieved through wide
participation and supports of the society (Nazarbayev,
2003b; 2011, 11–12).
It is not surprising or accidental that Kazakhstan pro-
posed its own vision of Eurasianism and placed it in the
ofﬁcial parlance to formulate foreign and domestic policies
accordingly. Kazakhstan is the largest (by territory), richest
and ethnically most divergent but stable and peaceful
country in Central Asia2 which is always interested in
maintaining and developing closer relations with the
former Soviet Republics. Kazakhstan claims that it is unique
and it’s European and Asian roots are interwoven and the
combination of different cultures and traditions allows it to
take the best from both the European and Asian traditions
(Nazarbayev,1997; 2003c). Regis Gente (2010) believes that
the concept of Eurasianism came to Kazakhstan as response
to a historical preoccupation with Russian inﬂuence in the
region, and internationally it serves as a policy doctrine in
molding Kazakhstan’s geopolitical ambitions and foreign
policy goals and objectives. The Eurasian philosophy jus-
tiﬁes Kazakhstan’s ties with the West (USA, the EU and
other European countries), Asia and the Middle East. As
mentioned earlier, Kazakhstan wants to see itself as a
bridge between Asia and Europe and pursue an active
foreign policy through the membership and participation
in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Confer-
ence of Interaction and Conﬁdence-building Measures in
Asia (CICA), the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the
Custom’s Union and so on. Through an active Eurasian
policy of engagement, Kazakhstan intends to turn the2 The territory of Kazakhstan is 2.7 million square km which is more
than twice the territories of other four countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) combined (2.7 million square km). Simi-
larly, the approximate GDP of Kazakhstan in 2010 was about 130 billion
US dollars (with an average per capita income of more than 11,000 dol-
lars) while the combined GDP of other four Central Asian states was
about 76 billion US dollars with an average per capita GDP income of
3422 dollars.‘curse’ of geography into strength and advantage by
maintaining and balancing relations with all major actors in
the world (Olcott, 2002).
Despite all attempts to prove and justify that Kazakh-
stan’s policy of Eurasianism is an objective, neutral and
positive category with no inherent contradictions that
serves interests of all stakeholders; both internal and
external, there are skeptics for whom Eurasianism in
Kazakhstan is a state oriented nationalism. M. Laruelle, a
French expert on Central Asia, claims that the concept of
“Eurasianism” from a Kazakh stand is a hidden form of
nationalism (2004, 187) and she provides numerous ex-
amples of state language and other policies in support of
her argument.
One of the major problems of Kazakhstani version of
Eurasianism is that despite all attempts by President Naz-
arbayev, his supporters and research and academic in-
stitutions the concept of Eurasianism is not yet clearly
deﬁned and understood by the public at large with the full
picture and implications of the issue. The Government may
have steered the concept to its advantage with respect to
legitimization of state’s certain policies which has given
rise to various interpretations of the phenomenon. Another
strong criticism, mainly comes from intellectuals, is that
since Gumilev’s studies of Eurasianism no serious progress
or theoretical study and research has been done or
analytical and methodological frameworks have been
developed on the issue rather the focus is more on other
sub-ordinate subjects like bridge concept and so on.
Kazakhstan’s Eurasian policy is designed to serve mul-
tiple goals and purposes; externally to improve relations
with Russia and other regional countries based on Eurasian
solidarity, balancing relations with Asia and Europe by
playing the role of a ‘bridge between Asia and Europe’ and
claiming as a bastion of peace, stability and neutrality, and
domestically to create a successful multi-ethnic, multi-na-
tional peaceful and harmonious nation with stability and
harmony.
5.1.1. Domestic policies
Kazakhstan is a multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-
confessional state where peoples from all origins live in
peace and harmony. There are more than 140 national and
ethnic groups with 46 faiths and confessions where the
Kazakhs are the majority (58.9%) followed by the Russians
(25.9%), Ukrainians (2.9%), Uzbeks (2.8%), Uyghur, Tatars
and Germans.3 Immediately after independence
Kazakhstan was worried and concerned about potential
Russian interventions and territorial ambitions, particularly
in those areas where the population was predominantly
ethnic Russian and it further aggravated by repeated
comments and slogans by some radical Russian leaders,
nationalists and extremists. So, one of the most important
goals and objectives of the Eurasian policy was to cooperate
and consolidate relations with Moscow and at the same
time to promote and practice policies of national unity,
cohesion, harmony and understanding among various3 For details, see Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the USA;
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?page¼ethnic-groups.
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of the Constitution of Kazakhstan conﬁrms that nobody
will be discriminated “for reasons of origin, social, property
status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, and
attitude toward religion, convictions, place of residence or
any other circumstances”. In order to maintain social sta-
bility and religious harmony, the Constitution also prohibits
the formation and activities of any social and political or-
ganizations that undermine “the security of the state,
including social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal
enmity” (Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995).
An Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan was created by
President Nazarbayev in 1995 by bringing together more
than 800 ethnic and cultural associations who elect 9
members to the Majilis [lower house of parliament in
Kazakhstan] (Bowyer, 2008, 50–63). Kazakhstan is also
holding inter-faith, inter-religious, inter-ethnic and inter-
civilization dialog on a regular basis by bringing together
representatives of different civilizations, ethnic groups,
religions sects and beliefs. The National Unity Doctrine,
initiated in October 2008 and adapted in May 2010, is
designed to reﬂect the common ideals consolidating all
citizens of the country into a single nation and to create a
cohesive, united nation based on ethnic, religious, national
and other socio-cultural harmony and peace (Kulshmanov,
2009).
Kazakhstan’s policy of Eurasianism is not simply an
abstract concept but it is reﬂected and very much alive and
visible in all aspects of social, economic and political life.
One of the most well-known public universities in
Kazakhstan is named as ‘Eurasia University’, the Eurasian
Bank and other multiple social political and cultural orga-
nizations and institutions bearing the name of Eurasia – are
operating in the country and focusing on the issues and
aspects of Eurasian space. Press and media, both printing
and electronic, are feeding back the concepts, ideas and
perceptions of Eurasianism on a continuous basis and
helping to mold social learning and consciousness in the
spirits of Eurasianism. Research institutions, academics,
intellectuals, political leaders and government ofﬁcials are
actively involved in supporting, publicizing, propagating
and justifying the needs and importance of the policy of
Eurasianism for Kazakhstan through their research, publi-
cations, public relations and policy statements. Numerous
seminars, conferences, discussions, debates and round-
tables are organized on a regular basis with participations
of local and foreign leaders, policy planners and specialists.
In fact, the Eurasian University in Astana serves as a center
for research, debates and discussions and publishes books
andmaterials on Eurasianism. The EurasianMedia Forum is
one the most powerful and strong media forum in the CIS
aimed at deﬁning the strategic role of Eurasia in world af-
fairs, exploring a new approach to international relations,
promoting equality of access to reliable public information
throughout the area and encouraging the highest standards
of journalism.4
To sum up, Eurasianism in internal affairs of Kazakhstan
means promotion of Eurasian policies and values, like4 For details, see http://www.eamedia.org/2010/642.tolerance and respect of traditions and cultures of all peoples
living in the state. Kazakhs and Russians are the two domi-
nant ethnic groups who live in peace and comfort and the
policy of Eurasianism helps to foster national unity, stability
and peace. A policy of multilingualism is in place where
Kazakh is the state language while Russian is the ofﬁcial
language for inter-ethnic communications. Kazakhstan, as a
nation, is very proud of its values, customs, religion and
traditions rooted in Eurasianism that blends and combines
both Asian and European culture and traditions and thus
makes it an ideal model for peace, stability and nation-
building for other multi-national states.
5.2. Regional policies
5.2.1. Central Asia
Since independence Kazakhstan has pursued a policy of
economic cooperation and political accommodation vis-à-
vis its policy toward other Central Asian states although
they were never considered as strategically important at
the level of Russia or China. Nevertheless, a number of
initiatives were taken by Astana in order to create some
forms of economic integration on the regional basis most of
which were either failed or made very slow progress. One
of the ﬁrst attempts was to create the Free Trade Zone in
the Eurasian space consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan in 1994 but it never came into
being because of Russia’s refusal to ratify it and demand for
exclusive rights on oil and gas sectors. In 1999, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan signed a new
treaty for a Customs Union and the Common Economic
Space with the goal of further economic integration. Sub-
sequently, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization
(now defunct), the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and the Single Economic Space project were
created. The Eurasian Association of Economic Cooperation
(EurAsEC) was created in 2000 with the speciﬁc goals and
objectives of creating Customs Union among the ﬁve
member countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia
and Tajikistan) with a clear mandate to create common
customs borders among its member states, to elaborate on
a common foreign economic policy, tariffs and price policy
and other mechanisms needed for common market.
After years of frustrating experiences with fellow
Central Asian states, actively pursued the policy of
regional integration with the participation of Russia and
Belarus and the Treaty on the Establishment of an Inte-
grated Customs Area and Formation of a Customs Union
was signed in 2007 while the related control and regula-
tory agencies were founded in 2007–2010. On November
27, 2009 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to create a
Customs Union (CU) that would include the formation of a
common customs space by July 2010 and paved the way
for further integration resulted in creating a single eco-
nomic space started in January 2012. Accordingly, the CU
was created in January 2010 within the framework of the
EurAsEC but it was unable to start functioning until the
treaty was ratiﬁed and the customs and other codes were
harmonized and ﬁnally on July 1st, 2011 the CU came into
being.
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membership in the CU although there are still a number of
unresolved issues and challenges. Tajikistan is the next
country that expressed interests in joining the CU although
it has not yet applied considering the economic and polit-
ical circumstances in the country and growing security
threats emanating from the South because of escalating
conﬂicts in Afghanistan, Dushanbe will hardly have any
choice other than joining the Russian-led CU. Although
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has not yet expressed any
interests in joining it but if the CU will grow further and
make good progress pressure from Moscow will continue
and it will be difﬁcult for them to remain outside the Union
economically and politically. Kazakhstan may try to
convince them by explaining the merits and beneﬁts of
joining such a Union without exerting pressure (which will
be done by Moscow). As Eurasianism has become the core
values of Kazakhstan’s regional policy, its relations with
other Central Asian states will be viewed and interpreted
through the prisms of its relations with Moscow as well as
its role, place and beneﬁts from the CU. Kazakhstan may
not put pressure on other Central Asian states to join the CU
but if they join this will beneﬁt Astana of having a larger
market and improved economic and trade relations with
them.
5.2.2. China
Geographically, Kazakhstan is surrounded by some of
the major and emerging powers on earth; Russia in the
North and North-West, China in the East and Iran and India
are distant neighbors in the South and South-West while
the War in Afghanistan is in its vicinity where the US
and NATO troops are stationed and ﬁghting against
terrorism and fundamentalism. So, it is very important for
Kazakhstan to maintain and improve relations with the
neighbors and regional powers, particularly with China
with whom Kazakhstan has a common border of 1700 km.
Immediately after independence Kazakhstan was actively
involved in mending fences with China, including resolving
some of the territorial disputes, and expanding and pro-
moting trade, economic and security relations based on the
principles of peaceful coexistence, economic cooperation,
mutual trust and respect of each others’ social/political
order/system and respect of sovereignty. A Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation and a Declaration on Strategic
Partnership were singed in 2002 and 2006 respectively.
Within the framework of the SCO, the two countries are
working closely to promote economic and trade relations
as well as resolving bilateral and regional issues and con-
ﬂicts (Gleason, 2001). In 2010, Chinawas the second largest
trade partner of Kazakhstan (with 24.3% trade turnover)
behind the EU27 (with 28.5%). Other important sectors of
China’s relations with Kazakhstan are the energy, trans-
portation and communication (Dodonov, 2010, 11–15).
There are, however, some worries and concerns in Beijing
regarding the recently created Customs Union and its true
purpose and intensions (some Western press and media
described it as an anti-Chinese venture headed by Russia)
but Kazakhstan’s leadership denounced such a view and
rejected it as a propaganda, totally baseless and far from the
truth (Nazarbayev, 2011, 8). There are also concerns inKazakhstan regarding the ethnic unrests in China’s Zhen-
jiang province and its potential spillover on its territory.
5.2.3. Russia
Russia is the largest and most important partner for
Kazakhstan for a number of reasons; Kazakhstan has a
7591 km border with Russia and out of the 14 oblasts
(administrative districts) 7 have direct border with Russia
(Gente, 2010, 2). The (inter) dependence created during the
long years of the USSR in transportation, communication
and infrastructure is still in place (to some extent) and a
closer and integrated relations between the two countries
will be mutually beneﬁcial which was one of the main
motives for the creation of the Customs Union. Cooperation
in energy sector between the two countries is of crucial
importance (Yesdauletova, 2009). As a Eurasian state,
Kazakhstan maintains a delicate balance with major
regional powers through trade, investment and participa-
tion in a cluster of organizations. According to Richard
Weitz (2008, 10) since independence Kazakhstan has
been following ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy that seeks to
maintain good relations with Russia, China, Japan, the
United States, and the European Union as well as other
countries with important economic, political, or other roles
in Eurasia. Kazakhstan is already balancing its relations
with both China and Russia within the SCO and wants to
cement it further through the new institutional framework
of the Customs Union. A close analysis of Kazakhstan’s
policy of Eurasianism reveals that it is mainly directed to-
ward economic integration at regional level by involving
other post-Soviet states setting aside (at least for now)
complex and controversial issues like political, ideological
and security.
5.2.4. Foreign policies: European Union and USA
At the international level, the Eurasian policy serves as a
cornerstone for designing and implementing Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy of maintaining and developing relations with
all countries and regions in the world without annoying or
agonizing Russia. Unlike, the Russian Eurasianism, in the
Kazakhstani version there is no apparent conﬂict between
Eurasianism and Altantism rather they are convergent,
complimentary and enforce the common values and prin-
ciples. The Atlantic Council in its studies and research also
claims and suggests that Eurasia is a part of transatlantic
security system that opposes the Russian nationalist
perception of Eurasian security. In a report on ‘Modernizing
the OSCE’, Ambassador Kurt Volker (2010), Managing Di-
rector of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, pro-
posed to create a task force on ‘Eurasia as Part of Trans-
atlantic Security’ with the goal of developing a coherent,
effective U.S. strategy toward Eurasia. Kazakhstan’s policy
of Eurasianism does not oppose globalization rather con-
siders it as an alternative way of development and inte-
gration that allows Kazakhstan to integrate into the global
process.
Central Asia is of crucial geostrategic importance to the
European Union (EU) as the region represents as a bridge to
China, Afghanistan and the Middle East and source of sig-
niﬁcant energy imports for the EU (Akiner, 2010). But no
G. Mostafa / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 160–170168separate policy for Central Asia was developed by the EU in
the initial years rather it was viewed through its ‘Neigh-
borhood Policy’ and the region was considered as ‘Neigh-
bors of EU’s Neighborhood’ (Rahr, 2009). In 2007 a broad
strategy for assistance to Central Asia was adopted where
the objectives were: (a) to ensure the stability and the se-
curity of the countries of the region, (b) to help eradicate
poverty and increase living standards in the context of the
Millennium Development Goals, and (c) to facilitate/pro-
mote closer regional cooperation both within Central Asia
and between Central Asia and the EU, particularly in the
energy, transport, higher education and environmental
sectors (European Community Regional Strategy Paper for
Assistance to Central Asia for the period of 2007–2013,
pp. 4–8). The EU’s policy of the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) includes all ﬁve Central Asian states that
are beneﬁciaries of it and seek to institutionalize legal,
economic and social reforms with the EU standards
(Sharipov, 2008). Kazakhstan developed a detailed policy of
the ‘Way to Europe’ with 3 apparent goals and objectives:
to get foreign direct investments form Europe with the aim
of bringing Kazakhstan at the level of strategic partnership
with the European countries by improving cooperation in
the ﬁelds of new technologies, energy, transport, engi-
neering; to improve and enhance Kazakhstan institutional
and legislative base by using positive experience of the EU
(Cutler, 2010).
Over the years Kazakhstan’s relations with the EU grew
fast and steadily and the OSCE Summit in Astana in
December 2010 helped to cement those relations further. In
2010, the EU was the largest trading partner of Kazakhstan
with 28.6% of trade turnover, China with 24.3%, Russia with
19.3%, followed by Turkey and the US with only 3.8% and
3.1% respectively.5 Nevertheless, there are issues and
challenges where the parties differ in views and percep-
tions: Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states consider
terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, spillover of the war in
Afghanistan and growing Islamic radicalism and funda-
mentalism as the main sources of instability and insecurity,
while the EU, although recognizes some those threats,
considers the lack of democracy, good governance, human
rights, corruptions and others as main sources of instability
and insecurity. Many EU Members are concerned and sus-
picious about the proposed Eurasian Union, particularly
about Russia’s future role and place in the Union.
As far as the Kazakhstan–US relations were initial con-
cerns in Washington about the enriched nuclear materials
(ready to make bombs) in the territory of Kazakhstan after
the collapse of the USSR but it was resolved peacefully and
the materials were airlifted to the US through the program
‘Project Sapphire’ (Porter, 1997). Other major US interests
are; securing military and security supports and coopera-
tion from Kazakhstan in America’s global war on terrorism
in Afghanistan as well as Kazakhstan playing the role of5 Kazakhstan’s main import partners in 2010 were; Russia 33.7%, China
28.5%, EU27 19.9% with the US only 2.3%. Major export partners were:
EU27 35.1%, China 21.1%, Russia 8.4%, followed by Turkey, Canada and the
US. respectively. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113406.pdf.stabilizer in the region which is crucially important for the
US both economically and geo-politically. As far the
Kazakhstan’s Eurasian project is concerned, Washington
seems to be less interested and worried about as any
attempt of free trade and expansion of liberal, free market
economy is welcome to the US. But the USA, like Europe, is
suspicious about the future role of Russia in the region and
warns that any attempt to control and limit the sovereignty
and independence of Central Asian states by Russia will not
be tolerated (Ismailov & Papava, 2010, 82).
5.2.5. Other countries
Another important aspect of Kazakhstan’s Eurasian
foreign policy is its emphasis on trade and economic re-
lations with emerging market economies in Asia and Asia-
Paciﬁc regions, including the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa). For Kazakhstan, interactions with
both East and West in political, economic, social and cul-
tural spheres are crucial and important for peace, stability,
security and prosperity in the Eurasian zone (Universal
Doctrine of Eurasianism, 2008).
The Eurasian policy of Kazakhstan has another dimen-
sion; its relations with the Muslim countries which are
important in order to strengthen its relations with the Arab
and other Muslim countries (Mostafa, 2009). Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy toward the Muslim world is mainly directed
through the 57-member Organization of Islamic Coopera-
tion (OIC) where Kazakhstan held the Chairmanship in
2011–2012. In his speech at the Council of ForeignMinisters
of the OIC held in Astana in 2010, President Nazarbayev
suggested establishing a special website to highlight the
activities of the OIC and encourage the young generation to
turn to religion and Islamic culture and popularize Islamic
spiritual values. He also emphasized the need to establish
an open, honest dialog between the Muslim world and the
West.6 Kazakhstan’s relations with Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan are developed and maintained within the frame-
work of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),
created by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in the 1980s, and all
ﬁve Central Asian states plus Afghanistan and Azerbaijan
joined the organization formally in November 1992.7
6. Challenges and difﬁculties of Eurasian policy
The recently created CU and the future plan of trans-
forming it into a Eurasian Union by 2015 is viewed as the
success of the policy of Eurasianism and victory of
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Although the CU has made
notable progress during the short period of time, it has its
challenges and difﬁculties.
First, there is a continuous debate on sharing the beneﬁts
of the CU among member states. According to the mecha-
nism of distribution of import customs duties between the
member countries, Belarus gets 4.70% while Kazakhstan’s6 Address by President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the 38th OIC Council of
Foreign Ministers, June 28, 2011.
7 The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is a successor of
Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD) which was created by Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey in 1964 and renamed as ECO in 1985. http://www.
ecosecretariat.org/.
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observers have doubts and suspicions about Russia’s true
political and ideological goals and objectives in creating the
CU. Oppositions in Kazakhstan and Belarus are worried and
concerned about Russian’s role and place in the Union and
believe that the creation of the CU is a design by Russian
ultra-nationalists, Neo-Eurasianists to restore Russian he-
gemony and imperial goals of restoring of the USSR.
Second, the agreement for creating the CU has been
signed by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus
(who are elected but there are concerns and questions
about the freedom, fairness and legitimacy of those elec-
tions) and ratiﬁed by their respective Legislative bodies
(that may not be fully independent and democratically
elected). Another major complain is that there were never
enough public debate and discussion on the issue of the CU
and it is extremely difﬁcult to assess and know about the
real public support on this issue. Radical political change in
any of the member states (there is a real possibility in
Belarus) may jeopardize the future of the Union.
Third, there seems to have differences in visions and
perceptions among the member states about the future of
the Eurasian Union. President Nazarbayev unequivocally
stated that the Union will not have any anti-Chinese, anti-
West, anti-Global and anti-Atlantic direction but in Putin’s
and Lukashenka’s views these issues are not very clear.
Then there are disagreements regarding among the mem-
bers about the future expansion of the Union; both Presi-
dent Nazarbayev and Lukashenka want to keep it among
the former Soviet Republics while Russian experts argue to
include Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Mol-
dova and Mongolia into the Union where Russian will be
the ofﬁcial language and Ruble the unit of currency.
Fourth, the ghosts of past failures of integration at-
tempts are still alive, not mentioning the psychological and
emotional factors of heavy-handed ideological and political
totalitarian repressive rules of the USSR, and any initiative
for integration taken by Russian Federation, whether eco-
nomic or political, may be viewed cautiously and suspi-
ciously by other post-Soviet States.
Fifth, Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy and
friendly cooperative relations with countries in the world is
well known and the country enjoys a prestigious and
respected position in the community of nations but too
close relations with Moscow, both political and economic,
through the framework of the Eurasian Union, may damage
that balance and may negatively affect the country’s long-
term foreign policy interests.
Sixth, history shows that for the success of a Union or
Alliance, there must be a leader, a ﬁnancier who is able and
willing to pay the price as and when necessary; the US has
been doing that role for the NATO and for global security
and Germany has been playing the similar role for the EU.
So the fundamental question: is Russia able or willing to
play that role?
Finally, the issue of time limit. Experts and observers
cast doubts onwhether the Union can sustain andmaintain8 For details see, www.tsouz.ru/KTS/meeting2010-03-25/pages/R_199.
aspx.the tempo of such a fast and quick growth and develop-
ment. As mentioned earlier, the CU started functioning in
July 2011 and within 6 months the Member states decided
to elevate it into the Common Economic Space (CES) and to
transform it into a full Union by 2015 when it took the EU
for about three decades to attain that stage.
7. Conclusion
Among the various types and versions of Eurasianism
discussed in the paper, the Russian views and perceptions
of Eurasianism developed, suggested and propagated
mainly by radical nationalists who seem to be very active,
dominant and organized academically and intellectually
but it did not evolve as a state policy or ideology. Kazakh-
stan’s policy of Eurasianism serves several purposes:
internationally, it helps the state to develop and maintain
balanced and friendly relations with all major states and
blocs; regionally it is used as a vehicle and policy guideline
for creating and deepening the integration process at the
post-Soviet space; domestically, the policy of Eurasianism
is used for consolidating national integration, national-
building and creating national consensus and harmony
among the different segments of population.
Kazakhstanwelcomed the Russian and Belarusian views
of integrationwith its ownplans, ideas and suggestions and
has been working hard for a greater integration of Eurasia.
But there are potential challenges and difﬁculties; on the
Russian side the nationalists and Neo-Eurasianists are
excited and thrilled that Russia will re-emerge and re-
establish its power and inﬂuence in the Eurasian space
which was lost as a result of the collapse of the USSR which
Vladimir Putin characterized as the “Great Geo-political
disaster in Eurasia”. But nationalists, modernists, business
leaders and elites in both Kazakhstan and Belarus may not
be so supportive and enthusiastic about the Eurasian Union
and may oppose such a move.
As far as, Kazakhstan’s role and place in improving re-
lations between Asia and Europe are concerned it appears
to have the commitment, ability and willingness at the
level of top leadership but its success and effectiveness will
depend on a number of factors; political developments,
institution building and democratization process in the
country, political changes and future leadership, balance of
political power and interests among political and social
groups and forces and their inﬂuence and impacts on do-
mestic peace, stability and harmony. Any radical changes
in regional politics (Central Asian countries, China and
Russia) and future trends and directions of the Afghan war
may limit and affect Kazakhstan policy options and
choices.
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